

# Inclusions between quantified provability logics

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## Outline

- 1 Background
- 2 Artemov's Lemma
- 3 Results

## Outline

- ① **Background**
- ② Artemov's Lemma
- ③ Results

- Let  $\mathcal{L}_A = \{0, S, +, \times, <, =\}$  be the language of first-order arithmetic.
- In this talk,  $T$ ,  $T_0$  and  $T_1$  always denote recursively enumerable  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -theories extending  $\mathbf{I}\Sigma_1$ .
- Let  $\text{Th}(T)$  be the set of all  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -sentences provable in  $T$ .
- Let  $\text{Pr}_T(x)$  be a natural **provability predicate** of  $T$ .

## Fact

For any formulas  $\varphi$  and  $\psi$ ,

- 1  $T \vdash \varphi \Rightarrow \mathbf{I}\Sigma_1 \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner)$
- 2  $\mathbf{I}\Sigma_1 \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \rightarrow \psi \urcorner) \rightarrow (\text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner))$
- 3  $\mathbf{I}\Sigma_1 \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \urcorner)$
- 4  $\mathbf{I}\Sigma_1 \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner)$  (Löb's theorem)

## GL

These properties of  $\text{Pr}_T(x)$  can be described using modal logic.

### Definition (GL)

The axioms and rules of the modal propositional logic GL are as follows:

**A1** All tautologies

**A2**  $\Box(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\Box A \rightarrow \Box B)$

**A3**  $\Box(\Box A \rightarrow A) \rightarrow \Box A$

**R1** 
$$\frac{A \quad A \rightarrow B}{B} \quad (\text{Modus ponens})$$

**R2** 
$$\frac{A}{\Box A} \quad (\text{Necessitation})$$

# Arithmetical interpretations

To connect arithmetic and modal logic precisely, I introduce the notion of arithmetical interpretation.

## Definition (arithmetical interpretation)

A mapping  $f$  from the set of all propositional variables to the set of  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -sentences is called an **arithmetical interpretation**.

Each arithmetical interpretation  $f$  is uniquely extended to a mapping  $f_T$  from the set of all propositional modal formulas to the set of  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -sentences inductively as follows:

- 1  $f_T(\perp)$  is  $0 = 1$ ;
- 2  $f_T$  commutes with each propositional connective;
- 3  $f_T(\Box A)$  is  $\text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner f_T(A) \urcorner)$ .

# Propositional provability logic and Solovay's theorem

Definition (propositional provability logic)

$PL(T) := \{A \mid \forall f: \text{arithmetical interpretation}, T \vdash f_T(A)\}$   
is the **propositional provability logic** of  $T$ .

Proposition (arithmetical soundness)

For any theory  $T$ ,  $GL \subseteq PL(T)$ .

Solovay's arithmetical completeness theorem states that the converse inclusion holds for many theories.

Arithmetical completeness theorem (Solovay, 1976)

If  $T$  is  $\Sigma_1$ -sound, then  $PL(T) = GL$ .

## More on Solovay's theorem

Moreover, Visser listed all the possibilities for  $\text{PL}(T)$ .

### Definition

The sequence  $(\text{Con}_T^n)_{n \in \omega}$  of  $\Pi_1$  sentences is defined as follows:

- $\text{Con}_T^0$  is the sentence  $0 = 0$ ;
- $\text{Con}_T^{n+1}$  is the sentence  $\text{Con}_{T+\text{Con}_T^n}$ .

### Theorem (Visser, 1984)

- $\text{PL}(T) = \mathbf{GL} \iff T + \{\text{Con}_T^n \mid n \geq 0\}$  is consistent;
- $\text{PL}(T) = \mathbf{GL} + \Box^n \perp \iff n = \min\{k \mid T \vdash \neg \text{Con}_T^k\}$ .

$\Box^n \perp$  is  $\underbrace{\Box \dots \Box}_n \perp$ .



From Solovay's and Visser's theorems, we have:

- $\text{PL}(T)$  is a primitive recursive set.
- $\text{PL}(T)$  depends only on the least  $n$  such that  $T \vdash \neg\text{Con}_T^n$ , and therefore depends very little on the theory  $T$  itself.
- Since  $\text{GL} + \Box^m \perp \subseteq \text{GL} + \Box^n \perp \iff m \geq n$ ,  
for any theories  $T_0$  and  $T_1$ ,

$$\text{PL}(T_0) \subseteq \text{PL}(T_1) \text{ or } \text{PL}(T_1) \subseteq \text{PL}(T_0).$$

- By extending the framework of the argument to predicate logic, the provability logic of  $T$  may become dependent on the theory  $T$  and have more fine-grained properties regarding the provability predicate  $\text{Pr}_T(x)$  of  $T$ .
- Many works on quantified provability logic were done, especially in the 1980s.

# The language of quantified modal logic

## The language of quantified modal logic

- The language of quantified modal logic is the language of first-order predicate logic without function and constant symbols equipped with the unary modal operators  $\Box$  and  $\Diamond$ .
- The languages of quantified modal logic and first-order arithmetic have the same variables.

# Arithmetical interpretation

## Definition (arithmetical interpretation)

A mapping  $f$  from the set of all atomic formulas of quantified modal logic to the set of  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -formulas satisfying the following condition is called an **arithmetical interpretation**: For each atomic formula  $P(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ ,

- $f(P(x_1, \dots, x_n))$  is an  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -formula  $\varphi(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  with the same free variables;
- $f(P(y_1, \dots, y_n))$  is  $\varphi(y_1, \dots, y_n)$  for any variables  $y_1, \dots, y_n$ .

Each arithmetical interpretation  $f$  is uniquely extended to a mapping  $f_T$  from the set of all quantified modal formulas to the set of  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -formulas inductively as follows:

- 1  $f_T(\perp)$  is  $0 = 1$ ;
- 2  $f_T$  commutes with each propositional connective and quantifier;
- 3  $f_T(\Box A(x_1, \dots, x_n))$  is the formula  $\text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner f_T(A(x_1, \dots, x_n)) \urcorner)$ .

# Quantified provability logic

## Definition (quantified provability logic)

$\text{QPL}(T)$

$:= \{A \mid A: \text{sentence and } \forall f: \text{arithmetical interpretation, } T \vdash f_T(A)\}$

is the **quantified provability logic** of  $T$ .

## Proposition (arithmetical soundness)

For any theory  $T$ ,  $\text{QGL} \subseteq \text{QPL}(T)$ .

- Does  $\text{QPL}(\text{PA}) \subseteq \text{QGL}$  hold? (Avron, 1984)
- Is  $\text{QPL}(\text{PA})$  r.e.? (Boolos, 1979)

# Vardanyan's theorem

Vardanyan gave a negative answer to these questions.

Theorem (Vardanyan, 1985)

**QPL(PA) is  $\Pi_2^0$ -complete.**

# Montagna's theorem

$\text{QPL}(T)$  may heavily depends on the theory  $T$ .

**Theorem (Montagna, 1984)**

If  $T_1$  is finitely axiomatizable,  $T_1 \not\vdash \neg \text{Con}_{T_1}$  and  $T_0 \vdash \text{Con}_{T_1} \rightarrow \text{Con}_{T_0}^2$ , then  $\text{QPL}(T_0) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}(T_1)$ .

**Example**

For  $0 < i < j$ ,  $\text{QPL}(\mathbf{I}\Sigma_i) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}(\mathbf{I}\Sigma_j)$ .

Notice that  $\text{PL}(\mathbf{I}\Sigma_i) = \text{PL}(\mathbf{I}\Sigma_j) = \text{GL}$ .

Moreover,  $\text{QPL}(T)$  also depends on  $\Sigma_1$  formulas defining  $T$ .

### Definition ( $\Sigma_1$ definition)

We say a formula  $\tau(v)$  is a **definition** of a theory  $T$  if for any natural number  $n$ ,

$$\mathbb{N} \models \tau(\bar{n}) \iff n \text{ is the Gödel number of some axiom of } T.$$

A  $\Sigma_1$  formula defining  $T$  is called a  **$\Sigma_1$  definition** of  $T$ .

Let  $\tau(v)$  be a  $\Sigma_1$  definition of  $T$ .

- We can construct a  $\Sigma_1$  provability predicate  $\text{Pr}_\tau(x)$  of  $T$  saying that “ $x$  is provable in the theory defined by  $\tau(v)$ ”.
- For each arithmetical interpretation  $f$ , the mapping obtained by extending  $f$  by using  $\text{Pr}_\tau(x)$  is denoted by  $f_\tau$ .  
That is,  $f_\tau(\Box A(x_1, \dots, x_n))$  is  $\text{Pr}_\tau(\ulcorner f_\tau(A(\dot{x}_1, \dots, \dot{x}_n)) \urcorner)$ .
- $\text{QPL}_\tau(T)$   
:=  $\{A \mid A: \text{sentence and } \forall f: \text{arithmetical interpretation, } T \vdash f_\tau(A)\}$



### Theorem (Artemov, 1986)

For any  $\Sigma_1$ -sound theory  $T$  and  $\Sigma_1$  definition  $\tau_0(v)$  of  $T$ ,  
 there exists a  $\Sigma_1$  definition  $\tau_1(v)$  of  $T$  s.t.  
 $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T)$ .

### Theorem (K., 2013)

Let  $0 < i < j$ .

There exists a  $\Sigma_1$  definition  $\tau_i(v)$  of some axiomatization of  $\text{I}\Sigma_i$  s.t.  
 for any  $\Sigma_1$  definition  $\tau_j(v)$  of  $\text{I}\Sigma_j$ ,

$$\text{QPL}_{\tau_i}(\text{I}\Sigma_i) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_j}(\text{I}\Sigma_j) \text{ and } \text{QPL}_{\tau_j}(\text{I}\Sigma_j) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_i}(\text{I}\Sigma_i).$$

The situation of the inclusion relation between quantified provability logics is completely different from that of propositional case.

- From Vardanyan's theorem, no recursively axiomatizable formal system characterizes  $\text{QPL}_\tau(T)$ .
- Furthermore, the inclusion between quantified provability logics seems to be rarely established.
- From these circumstances, I investigated the inclusion relation between quantified provability logics in order to know more about the dependence of  $\text{QPL}_\tau(T)$  on  $T$  and  $\text{Pr}_\tau(x)$ , and to better understand past researches.

## Outline

- ① Background
- ② **Artemov's Lemma**
- ③ Results



- The main tool of my study is Artemov's Lemma used in the proof of Vardanyan's theorem.
- To state Artemov's Lemma, I prepare some definitions.

### Definition

- We prepare predicate symbols  $P_Z(x)$ ,  $P_S(x, y)$ ,  $P_A(x, y, z)$ ,  $P_M(x, y, z)$ ,  $P_L(x, y)$  and  $P_E(x, y)$  corresponding to  $0$ ,  $S$ ,  $+$ ,  $\times$ ,  $<$  and  $=$ , respectively.
- For each  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -formula  $\varphi$ , let  $\varphi^*$  be a logically equivalent  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -formula where each atomic formula is one of the forms  $x = 0$ ,  $S(x) = y$ ,  $x + y = z$ ,  $x \times y = z$ ,  $x < y$  and  $x = y$ .
- Let  $\varphi^\circ$  be a relational formula obtained from  $\varphi^*$  by replacing each atomic formula with the corresponding relation symbol in  $\{P_Z, P_S, P_A, P_M, P_L, P_E\}$  adequately.
- Then  $\varphi^\circ$  is a quantified modal formula.

For example,  $(S(0) = x)^*$  is  $\exists v(v = 0 \wedge S(v) = x)$   
 and  $(S(0) = x)^\circ$  is  $\exists v(P_Z(v) \wedge P_S(v, x))$ .

# Artemov's Lemma

## Definition

Let  $D$  be the modal sentence

$$\bigwedge_{K \in \{Z, S, A, M, L, E\}} \left( \forall \vec{x} (P_K(\vec{x}) \rightarrow \Box P_K(\vec{x})) \wedge \forall \vec{x} (\neg P_K(\vec{x}) \rightarrow \Box \neg P_K(\vec{x})) \right).$$

## Artemov's Lemma

There exists an  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -sentence  $\xi$  such that  $\mathbf{I}\Sigma_1 \vdash \xi$   
and for any arithmetical interpretation  $f$ ,  $\Sigma_1$  definition  $\tau(v)$  of  $T$   
and  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -sentence  $\varphi$ ,

$$\mathbf{I}\Sigma_1 \vdash \text{Con}_\tau \wedge f_\tau(D) \wedge f_\tau(\xi^\circ) \rightarrow (\varphi \leftrightarrow f_\tau(\varphi^\circ)).$$

In the statement of the lemma, the  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -sentence  $\xi$  is a conjunction of several basic sentences of arithmetic such as  $\forall x \exists y (S(x) = y)$  and  $\forall x (x + 0 = x)$ .

## Visser and de Jonge's observation

What is important to me is the following consequence of Artemov's Lemma.

Proposition (Visser and de Jonge, 2006)

For any  $\Sigma_1$  definition  $\tau(v)$  of  $T$  and  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -sentence  $\varphi$ , TFAE:

- 1  $T + \text{Con}_\tau \vdash \varphi$ .
- 2  $\diamond T \wedge D \wedge \xi^\circ \rightarrow \varphi^\circ \in \text{QPL}_\tau(T)$ .

### Proof of Visser and de Jonge's proposition.

(1  $\Rightarrow$  2): **Suppose**  $T + \text{Con}_\tau \vdash \varphi$ .

**By Artemov's Lemma, for any arithmetical interpretation  $f$ ,**

$$\mathbf{IS}_1 \vdash \text{Con}_\tau \wedge f_\tau(D) \wedge f_\tau(\xi^\circ) \rightarrow (\varphi \leftrightarrow f_\tau(\varphi^\circ)).$$

**Then**  $T \vdash \text{Con}_\tau \wedge f_\tau(D) \wedge f_\tau(\xi^\circ) \rightarrow f_\tau(\varphi^\circ)$ .

$T \vdash f_\tau(\diamond\top \wedge D \wedge \xi^\circ \rightarrow \varphi^\circ)$ .

**Hence**  $\diamond\top \wedge D \wedge \xi^\circ \rightarrow \varphi^\circ \in \text{QPL}_\tau(T)$ .

(2  $\Rightarrow$  1): **Suppose**  $\diamond\top \wedge D \wedge \xi^\circ \rightarrow \varphi^\circ \in \text{QPL}_\tau(T)$ .

**Let  $f$  be an arithmetical interpretation such that for each  $K \in \{Z, S, A, M, L, E\}$ ,  $f(P_K(\vec{x}))$  is the intended  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -formula (for example,  $f(P_A(x, y, z))$  is  $x + y = z$ ).**

**Then**  $\mathbf{IS}_1 \vdash f_\tau(D) \wedge f_\tau(\xi^\circ)$  **and**  $\mathbf{IS}_1 \vdash \varphi \leftrightarrow f_\tau(\varphi^\circ)$ .

**Since**  $T \vdash \text{Con}_\tau \wedge f_\tau(D) \wedge f_\tau(\xi^\circ) \rightarrow f_\tau(\varphi^\circ)$ ,

$T + \text{Con}_\tau \vdash \varphi$ .



- Visser and de Jonge's result shows that  $\text{QPL}_\tau(T)$  has the complete information about  $\text{Th}(T + \text{Con}_\tau)$ .
- Moreover, the following corollary concerning inclusions between quantified provability logics is important.

### Corollary

If  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T_0) \subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T_1)$ , then  $\text{Th}(T_0 + \text{Con}_{\tau_0}) \subseteq \text{Th}(T_1 + \text{Con}_{\tau_1})$ .

### Proof.

Suppose  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T_0) \subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T_1)$ .

Let  $\varphi$  be any  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -sentence with  $T_0 + \text{Con}_{\tau_0} \vdash \varphi$ .

$\diamond T \wedge D \wedge \xi^\circ \rightarrow \varphi^\circ \in \text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T_0)$ . (by Proposition)

$\diamond T \wedge D \wedge \xi^\circ \rightarrow \varphi^\circ \in \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T_1)$ . (by the supposition)

$T_1 + \text{Con}_{\tau_1} \vdash \varphi$ . (by Proposition)





## Outline

- ① Background
- ② Artemov's Lemma
- ③ **Results**

# Main theorem 1

Inspired by Visser and de Jonge's proposition, I investigated further consequences of inclusions between quantified provability logics that result from Artemov's Lemma.

## Theorem (K.)

Let  $\tau_0(v)$  and  $\tau_1(v)$  be  $\Sigma_1$  definitions of  $T_0$  and  $T_1$ , respectively.

Suppose  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T_0) \subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T_1)$ .

Then:

- ①  $T_1 \vdash \text{Con}_{\tau_0}^n \leftrightarrow \text{Con}_{\tau_1}^n$  for any  $n \geq 1$ ;
- ②  $\text{Th}(T_0) \cap \Sigma_1 \subseteq \text{Th}(T_1) \cap \Sigma_1$ ;
- ③ for any  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -sentence  $\varphi$ ,

$$T_1 \vdash \text{Pr}_{\tau_0}(\ulcorner \text{Con}_{\tau_0} \rightarrow \varphi \urcorner) \leftrightarrow \text{Pr}_{\tau_1}(\ulcorner \text{Con}_{\tau_1} \rightarrow \varphi \urcorner);$$

- ④ for any  $\Pi_1$ -sentence  $\varphi$ ,

$$T_1 \vdash \text{Pr}_{\tau_1}(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_{\tau_0}(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner).$$

## Main theorem 1

## Theorem (K.)

Let  $\tau_0(v)$  and  $\tau_1(v)$  be  $\Sigma_1$  definitions of  $T_0$  and  $T_1$ , respectively.  
 Suppose  $\text{Th}(\mathbf{PA}) \subseteq \text{Th}(T_0)$  and  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T_0) \subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T_1)$ .

Then:

- ① for any  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -formula  $\varphi(\vec{x})$ ,

$$T_1 \vdash \forall \vec{x} \left( \text{Pr}_{\tau_0}(\ulcorner \text{Con}_{\tau_0} \rightarrow \varphi(\vec{x}) \urcorner) \leftrightarrow \text{Pr}_{\tau_1}(\ulcorner \text{Con}_{\tau_1} \rightarrow \varphi(\vec{x}) \urcorner) \right);$$

- ② then for any  $\Pi_1$ -formula  $\varphi(\vec{x})$ ,

$$T_1 \vdash \forall \vec{x} (\text{Pr}_{\tau_1}(\ulcorner \varphi(\vec{x}) \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_{\tau_0}(\ulcorner \varphi(\vec{x}) \urcorner));$$

- ③  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0 + \text{Con}_{\tau_0}^n}(T_0 + \text{Con}_{\tau_0}^n) \subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1 + \text{Con}_{\tau_1}^n}(T_1 + \text{Con}_{\tau_1}^n)$  for any  $n \geq 1$ .

## Corollaries (1/3)

**From this theorem, I obtained several refinements of known results.**

**Corollary 1 (A refinement of Montagna's theorem)**

**If  $T_1 \not\vdash \neg\text{Con}_{\tau_1}$  and  $T_0 \vdash \text{Con}_{\tau_1} \rightarrow \text{Con}_{\tau_0}^2$ ,  
then  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T_0) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T_1)$ .**

**Proof.**

**Suppose  $T_0 \vdash \text{Con}_{\tau_1} \rightarrow \text{Con}_{\tau_0}^2$  and  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T_0) \subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T_1)$ .  
Then  $T_1 \vdash \text{Con}_{\tau_1} \rightarrow \text{Con}_{\tau_0}^2$  and  $T_1 \vdash \text{Con}_{\tau_0}^2 \leftrightarrow \text{Con}_{\tau_1}^2$ .**

**So  $T_1 \vdash \text{Con}_{\tau_1} \rightarrow \text{Con}_{\tau_1}^2$ .**

**By Löb's theorem,  $T_1 \vdash \neg\text{Con}_{\tau_1}$ .**



**Theorem (Montagna, 1984), restated**

**If  $T_1$  is finitely axiomatizable,  $T_1 \not\vdash \neg\text{Con}_{T_1}$  and  $T_0 \vdash \text{Con}_{T_1} \rightarrow \text{Con}_{T_0}^2$ ,  
then  $\text{QPL}(T_0) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}(T_1)$ .**

## Corollaries (2/3)

## Corollary 2 (A refinement of Artemov's theorem)

**For any  $\Sigma_1$ -sound theory  $T$  and  $\Sigma_1$  definition  $\tau_0(v)$  of  $T$ , there exists a  $\Sigma_1$  definition  $\tau_1(v)$  of  $T$  s.t.**

**$\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T)$  and  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T)$ .**

## Proof.

**Let  $\tau_0(v)$  be any  $\Sigma_1$  definition of  $T$ .**

**Since  $T$  is  $\Sigma_1$ -sound, it is known that there exists a  $\Sigma_1$  definition  $\tau_1(v)$  of  $T$  such that  $T \not\vdash \text{Con}_{\tau_0} \rightarrow \text{Con}_{\tau_1}$ .**

**By the theorem,  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T)$  and  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T)$ .  $\square$**

## Theorem (Artemov, 1986), restated

**For any  $\Sigma_1$ -sound theory  $T$  and  $\Sigma_1$  definition  $\tau_0(v)$  of  $T$ , there exists a  $\Sigma_1$  definition  $\tau_1(v)$  of  $T$  s.t.**

**$\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T)$ .**

## Corollaries (3/3)

## Corollary 3

Suppose that  $T_0$  is consistent,  $T_1$  is  $\Sigma_1$ -sound and there exists a  $\Sigma_1$  definition  $\sigma_0(v)$  of  $T_0$  such that  $T_1 \vdash \text{Rfn}_{\sigma_0}(\Sigma_1)$ . Then, for any respective  $\Sigma_1$  definitions  $\tau_0(v)$  and  $\tau_1(v)$  of  $T_0$  and  $T_1$ ,  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T_0) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T_1)$  and  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T_1) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T_0)$ .

## Example (A refinement my previous result)

Let  $0 < i < j$ .

For any respective  $\Sigma_1$  definitions  $\tau_i(v)$ ,  $\tau_j(v)$  of  $\text{I}\Sigma_i$  and  $\text{I}\Sigma_j$ ,

$$\text{QPL}_{\tau_i}(\text{I}\Sigma_i) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_j}(\text{I}\Sigma_j) \text{ and } \text{QPL}_{\tau_j}(\text{I}\Sigma_j) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_i}(\text{I}\Sigma_i).$$

## Theorem (K., 2013), restated

Let  $0 < i < j$ .

There exists a  $\Sigma_1$  definition  $\tau_i(v)$  of some axiomatization of  $\text{I}\Sigma_i$  s.t. for any  $\Sigma_1$  definition  $\tau_j(v)$  of  $\text{I}\Sigma_j$

$$\text{QPL}_{\tau_i}(\text{I}\Sigma_i) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_j}(\text{I}\Sigma_j) \text{ and } \text{QPL}_{\tau_j}(\text{I}\Sigma_j) \not\subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_i}(\text{I}\Sigma_i).$$

$\Sigma_1$  provability logics

Researches on restricted arithmetical interpretations have also been done by many authors.

Definition ( $\Sigma_1$  arithmetical interpretation)

An arithmetical interpretation  $f$  is called  $\Sigma_1$  if

- (Propositional case) for any propositional variable  $p$ ,  $f(p)$  is a  $\Sigma_1$  sentence;
- (Predicate case) for any atomic formula  $P(\vec{x})$ ,  $f(P(\vec{x}))$  is a  $\Sigma_1$  formula.

Definition ( $\Sigma_1$  provability logics)

- $\text{PL}^{\Sigma_1}(T) := \{A \mid \forall f : \Sigma_1 \text{ arithmetical interpretation, } T \vdash f_T(A)\}$
- $\text{QPL}^{\Sigma_1}(T)$   
 $:= \{A \mid A \text{ is a sentence and } \forall f : \Sigma_1 \text{ arithmetical interpretation, } T \vdash f_T(A)\}$
- $\text{QPL}_{\tau}^{\Sigma_1}(T)$   
 $:= \{A \mid A \text{ is a sentence and } \forall f : \Sigma_1 \text{ arithmetical interpretation, } T \vdash f_{\tau}(A)\}$

## Known results for $\Sigma_1$ provability logics

In the propositional case,  $\text{PL}^{\Sigma_1}(T)$  is recursively axiomatizable.

Theorem (Visser)

If  $T$  is  $\Sigma_1$ -sound, then  $\text{PL}^{\Sigma_1}(T)$  is characterized by a formal system **GLV**.

In the predicate case, an analogue of Vardanyan's theorem holds.

Theorem (Berarducci, 1989)

$\text{QPL}^{\Sigma_1}(\text{PA})$  is  $\Pi_2^0$ -complete.



However, there is some benefit to deal with  $\Sigma_1$  arithmetical interpretations in my study.

- In the proof of Artemov's Lemma, the sentence  $\text{Con}_\tau \wedge f_\tau(D)$  is used to make the formulas  $f(P_K(\vec{x}))$  and  $\neg f(P_K(\vec{x}))$  equivalent to  $\Sigma_1$  formulas for each  $K \in \{Z, S, A, M, L, E\}$ :

$$f_\tau(P_K(\vec{x})) \leftrightarrow \text{Pr}_\tau(\ulcorner f_\tau(P_K(\vec{x})) \urcorner)$$

$$\neg f_\tau(P_K(\vec{x})) \leftrightarrow \text{Pr}_\tau(\ulcorner \neg f_\tau(P_K(\vec{x})) \urcorner).$$

- In the case that  $f$  is a  $\Sigma_1$  arithmetical interpretation, the same result holds without assuming  $\text{Con}_\tau \wedge f_\tau(D)$  by adding sufficiently many theorems of  $\text{I}\Sigma_1$  to the sentence  $\xi$  as conjuncts.
- This is guaranteed by the following equivalences:
  - $\neg P_Z(x) \leftrightarrow \exists y P_S(y, x)$ ;
  - $\neg P_S(x, y) \leftrightarrow \exists z (P_S(x, z) \wedge (P_L(z, y) \vee P_L(y, z)))$ ;
  - ...
  - $\neg P_E(x, y) \leftrightarrow P_L(x, y) \vee P_L(y, x)$ .

# Artemov's Lemma w.r.t. $\Sigma_1$ arithmetical interpretations

Then I obtained the following version of Artemov's Lemma with respect to  $\Sigma_1$  arithmetical interpretations.

## Lemma (K.)

There exists an  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -sentence  $\xi$  such that  $\mathbf{I}\Sigma_1 \vdash \xi$   
and for any  $\Sigma_1$  arithmetical interpretation  $f$ ,  $\Sigma_1$  definition  $\tau(v)$  of  $T$  and any  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -sentence  $\varphi$ ,

$$\mathbf{I}\Sigma_1 \vdash f_\tau(\xi^\circ) \rightarrow (\varphi \leftrightarrow f_\tau(\varphi^\circ)).$$

## Main theorem 2

By using this lemma, I proved the following theorem.

## Theorem (K.)

Let  $\tau_0(v)$  and  $\tau_1(v)$  be  $\Sigma_1$  definitions of  $T_0$  and  $T_1$ , respectively.

**TFAE:**

- ①  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}^{\Sigma_1}(T_0) \subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}^{\Sigma_1}(T_1)$ .
- ②  $\text{Th}(T_0) \subseteq \text{Th}(T_1)$  and for any  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -formula  $\varphi(\vec{x})$ ,

$$T_1 \vdash \forall \vec{x} (\text{Pr}_{\tau_0}(\ulcorner \varphi(\vec{x}) \urcorner) \leftrightarrow \text{Pr}_{\tau_1}(\ulcorner \varphi(\vec{x}) \urcorner)).$$

## Corollary

If  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}^{\Sigma_1}(T_0) \subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}^{\Sigma_1}(T_1)$ , then  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T_0) \subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T_1)$ .

## Corollary and Problem

### Conclusion

- By investigating several conclusions of the inclusion  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T_0) \subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T_1)$ , I showed that  $\text{QPL}_{\tau}(T)$  really depends on  $T$  and  $\text{Pr}_{\tau}(x)$ , and that the inclusion  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T_0) \subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T_1)$  rarely hold.
- By providing a necessary and sufficient condition for the inclusion  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}^{\Sigma_1}(T_0) \subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}^{\Sigma_1}(T_1)$ , I found an order in the world of quantified provability logics.

### Problem

Can we characterize the relation  $\text{QPL}_{\tau_0}(T_0) \subseteq \text{QPL}_{\tau_1}(T_1)$ ?

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